Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice
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Publication:1601452
In this paper is studied a stochastic equilibrium selection model for binary coordination games. Adopting the process model introduced by Blume, in particular are considered a large class of probabilistic choice behavior. The main result of the paper contained in the Theorem 4.2 shows that selection outcome for a linear coordination game is determined by the balance of the risk dominance, the aspiration/imitation, and the externality effects. It is also shown the way these effects together determine the outcome.
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Cited in
(29)- Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium
- The stochastic choice problem: A game-theoretic approach
- Prospect dynamics and loss dominance
- Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability
- Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.
- Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule
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- A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
- On the relationship between p-dominance and stochastic stability in network games
- The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
- A symmetry of fixation times in evoultionary dynamics
- Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
- Robust stochastic stability
- The logit-response dynamics
- Transitions between equilibria in bilingual games under logit choice
- Binary games with many players
- Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics
- Discontinuous and continuous stochastic choice and coordination in the lab
- SKEW-SYMMETRY UNDER SIMULTANEOUS REVISIONS
- Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games
- Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games
- Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures
- Selective games on binary relations
- Coordination and continuous stochastic choice
- Evolutionary game theory
- An experimental investigation of stochastic adjustment dynamics
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- Vaccination games and imitation dynamics with memory
- Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation
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