Binary games with state dependent stochastic choice
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Publication:1601452
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2808zbMath1137.91324OpenAlexW2030212627MaRDI QIDQ1601452
Publication date: 2002
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2808
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