Evolution in games with endogenous mistake probabilities.

DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2941zbMath1035.91006MaRDI QIDQ1867529

Eric E. C. van Damme, Joergen W. Weibull

Publication date: 2 April 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/1c779ce9-9daa-4893-9ddb-e393d5800797

zbMATH Keywords

evolution; mutation rates; mistakes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91D10: Models of societies, social and urban evolution

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Coalitional stochastic stability, Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play, Entropic penalties in finite games, Cycles versus equilibrium in evolutionary games, Payoff-dependent mistakes and \(q\)-resistant equilibrium, Robust stochastic stability, The logit-response dynamics, Stochastic stability on general state spaces, Rapid evolution under inertia

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