Robust stochastic stability
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Publication:2256867
DOI10.1007/s00199-014-0809-zzbMath1319.91033OpenAlexW3124737631MaRDI QIDQ2256867
Nick Netzer, Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Publication date: 23 February 2015
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/99355/7/econwp063.pdf
stochastic stabilitymutationslearning in gamesimitationlogit-response dynamicsradius-coradius theorems
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