When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action
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Publication:3502152
DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2008.00482.XzbMATH Open1138.91345MaRDI QIDQ3502152FDOQ3502152
Authors: David P. Myatt, Chris C. Wallace 
Publication date: 22 May 2008
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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