When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action

DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2008.00482.XMaRDI QIDQ3502152zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David P. Myatt, Chris C. Wallace

Publication date 22 May 2008

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Recommendations

• Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action
• Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game
• Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in spatially structured populations
• Collective action: experimental evidence
• Variability in group size and the evolution of collective action

Cited in

(12)

• Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration
• Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time
• An evolutionary analysis of the volunteer's dilemma
• Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game
• Private provision of discrete public goods
• A comparison of simple action-based and outcome-based policies for emergency-like situations
• Evolutionary game theory
• Robust stochastic stability
• Social influence: the \textit{usage history} heuristic
• Do beliefs about peers matter for donation matching? Experiments in the field and laboratory
• Cooperative dilemmas with binary actions and multiple players
• Long-run selection and the work ethic

This page was built for publication: When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3502152)