When Does One Bad Apple Spoil the Barrel? An Evolutionary Analysis of Collective Action
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Publication:3502152
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00482.xzbMath1138.91345MaRDI QIDQ3502152
Chris C. Wallace, David P. Myatt
Publication date: 22 May 2008
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
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