Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration
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Publication:2013367
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.06.001zbMATH Open1393.91012OpenAlexW244342035MaRDI QIDQ2013367FDOQ2013367
Authors: Jonathan Newton 
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://econ-wpseries.com/2015/201505-02.pdf
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Cited In (15)
- Agency, potential and contagion
- Labelling, homophily and preference evolution
- The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types
- The cost of collaboration
- Third party interventions mitigate conflicts on interdependent networks
- Deep and shallow thinking in the long run
- Agency equilibrium
- Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values
- Contribution-based grouping under noise
- Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture
- The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game
- When and how does mutation-generated variation promote the evolution of cooperation?
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- Groundwater usage and strategic complements. I. (Instrumental Variables)
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
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