Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games
DOI10.1007/S00182-014-0459-1zbMATH Open1388.91030OpenAlexW2126329988MaRDI QIDQ891334FDOQ891334
Authors: Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski
Publication date: 17 November 2015
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65428/
Recommendations
learningcooperative gamescoreevolutionary game theoryequitystochastic stabilityassignment gamesmatching markets
Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Matching models (91B68)
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Cited In (29)
- Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
- Exchange networks with stochastic matching
- Stochastic stability in assignment problems
- Coalitional stochastic stability in games, networks and markets
- Stochastic dynamics and Edmonds' algorithm
- The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets
- An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games
- The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
- Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies
- ``Greedy demand adjustment in cooperative games
- Match choice and Ghettoization in evolutionary games
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- Evolutionary dynamics of resource allocation in the Colonel Blotto game
- Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
- Trader matching and the selection of market institutions
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