Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00146-5zbMath1069.91009OpenAlexW3023474322MaRDI QIDQ1416497

Larry Samuelson, H. Peyton Young, Kenneth G. Binmore

Publication date: 14 December 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00146-5

zbMATH Keywords

Stochastic stabilityNash demand gameEvolutionary dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05)

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