Selection intensity and risk-dominant strategy: a two-strategy stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite population

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2016.10.039zbMath1411.91096OpenAlexW2551152043MaRDI QIDQ1735054

Jie-Ru Yu, Xiu-Deng Zheng, Yi Tao, Xue-Lu Liu

Publication date: 28 March 2019

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2016.10.039

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumselection intensityrisk-dominancestochastic evolutionary game dynamicsexpected fitness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

A dynamic parking charge optimal control model under perspective of commuters' evolutionary game behavior, Hamilton's rule and kin competition in a finite kin population, Vaccination dilemma on an evolving social network

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
• The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
• Analytical results for individual and group selection of any intensity
• Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
• Fixation of a deleterious allele under mutation pressure and finite selection intensity
• The Logic of Animal Conflict