Vaccination dilemma on an evolving social network
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Publication:2328280
DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2019.08.009zbMATH Open1422.92173arXiv1902.01540OpenAlexW2969234649WikidataQ92775115 ScholiaQ92775115MaRDI QIDQ2328280FDOQ2328280
Authors: Yuting Wei, Yaosen Lin, Bin Wu 
Publication date: 10 October 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: Vaccination is crucial for the control of epidemics. Yet it is a social dilemma since non-vaccinators can benefit from the herd immunity created by the vaccinators. Thus the optimum vaccination level is not reached via voluntary vaccination at times. Intensive studies incorporate social networks to study vaccination behavior, and it is shown that vaccination can be promoted on some networks. The underlying network, however, is often assumed to be static, neglecting the dynamical nature of social networks. We investigate the vaccination behavior on dynamical social networks using both simulations and mean-field approximations. We find that the more robust the vaccinator-infected-non-vaccinator links are or the more fragile the vaccinator-healthy-non-vaccinator links are, the higher the final vaccination level is. This result is true for arbitrary rationality. Furthermore, we show that, under strong selection, the vaccination level can be higher than that in the well-mixed population. In addition, we show that vaccination on evolving social network is equivalent to the vaccination in well mixed population with a rescaled basic reproductive ratio. Our results highlight the dynamical nature of social network on the vaccination behavior, and can be insightful for the epidemic control.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1902.01540
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Cited In (9)
- Opinion dynamics on biased dynamical networks: beyond rare opinion updating
- Coevolution of fairness and spite on stochastic dynamics networks
- Epidemic dynamics of complex networks under pulse treatment and vaccination
- Positive and negative effects of social impact on evolutionary vaccination game in networks
- Network structural metrics as early warning signals of widespread vaccine refusal in social-epidemiological networks
- Voluntary vaccination dilemma with evolving psychological perceptions
- Social dynamics and Parrondo's paradox: a narrative review
- Social relationship adjustments within the same sex promote marital bliss
- Operational issues and network effects in vaccine markets
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