Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubella

DOI10.3934/mbe.2009.6.839zbMath1178.92041OpenAlexW2049109733WikidataQ51783835 ScholiaQ51783835MaRDI QIDQ2654133

Beth Kochin, Eunha Shim, Alison P. Galvani

Publication date: 15 January 2010

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/mbe.2009.6.839

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryepidemiologyvaccinationrubella

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Medical epidemiology (92C60)

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