A game dynamic model for vaccine skeptics and vaccine believers: measles as an example
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Cites work
- A game dynamic model for delayer strategies in vaccinating behaviour for pediatric infectious diseases
- A susceptible-infected epidemic model with voluntary vaccinations
- An SIS epidemiology game with two subpopulations
- Dynamics of vaccination strategies via projected dynamical systems
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- Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3126094 (Why is no real title available?)
- Insights from epidemiological game theory into gender-specific vaccination against rubella
- Optimal tax/subsidy combinations for the flu season
- Vaccination and the theory of games
Cited in
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- Effect of population heterogeneity on herd immunity and on vaccination decision making process
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- Disease control through voluntary vaccination decisions based on the smoothed best response
- Conflicts of interest during contact investigations: a game-theoretic analysis
- Vaccination dilemma on an evolving social network
- Exploring epidemic voluntary vaccinating behavior based on information-driven decisions and benefit-cost analysis
- Bistable endemic states in a susceptible-infectious-susceptible model with behavior-dependent vaccination
- Effects of some sociological factors on the outbreak of chickenpox disease
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- Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in vaccination games
- A LQ Vaccine Communication Game
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- The contagion dynamics of vaccine skepticism
- Imperfect vaccine can yield multiple Nash equilibria in vaccination games
- Dynamical vaccination behavior with risk perception and vaccination rewards
- Effect of homophily on coupled behavior-disease dynamics near a tipping point
- Dynamics of vaccination in a time-delayed epidemic model with awareness
- Prediction of vaccination coverage levels in populations with increasing levels of heterogeneity
- Nash versus Kant: a game-theoretic analysis of childhood vaccination behavior
- Evolutionary dynamics of voluntary vaccination for imperfect multi-efficacy vaccines
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- Optimal vaccination strategies to reduce endemic levels of meningitis in Africa
- A game-theoretic approach to valuating toxoplasmosis vaccination strategies
- Optimal strategies for vaccination and social distancing in a game-theoretic epidemiologic model
- A game-theoretical analysis of poliomyelitis vaccination
- Evolving public perceptions and stability in vaccine uptake
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