Vaccination and the theory of games

DOI10.1073/pnas.0403823101zbMath1064.91029WikidataQ24561870 ScholiaQ24561870MaRDI QIDQ5460847

David J. D. Earn, Chris T. Bauch

Publication date: 19 July 2005

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0403823101

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

92D30: Epidemiology

91A80: Applications of game theory

Related Items

Globally stable endemicity for infectious diseases with information-related changes in contact patterns, A general approach for population games with application to vaccination, Multiple sources and routes of information transmission: implications for epidemic dynamics, Evolving public perceptions and stability in vaccine uptake, Global stability of an SIR epidemic model with information dependent vaccination, Modeling the effect of information quality on risk behavior change and the transmission of infectious diseases, Decentralized resource allocation to control an epidemic: a game theoretic approach, Vaccinating behaviour, information, and the dynamics of SIR vaccine preventable diseases, Dynamics of vaccination strategies via projected dynamical systems, Epidemiological effects of seasonal oscillations in birth rates, Dynamic equilibria of group vaccination strategies in a heterogeneous population, On the transmission of HIV with self-protective behavior and preferred mixing

Cites Work

• Frege's new science
• On the changing concept of evolutionary population stability as a reflection of a changing point of view in the quantitative theory of evolution
• Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy