The impact of irrational behaviors in the optional prisoner's dilemma with game‐environment feedback
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6152826
DOI10.1002/RNC.5935arXiv2106.07100MaRDI QIDQ6152826FDOQ6152826
Authors: Leonardo Stella, Dario Bauso 
Publication date: 13 February 2024
Published in: International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: In the optional prisoner's dilemma (OPD), players can choose to cooperate and defect as usual, but can also abstain as a third possible strategy. This strategy models the players' participation in the game and is a relevant aspect in many settings, e.g. social networks or opinion dynamics where abstention is an option during an election. In this paper, we provide a formulation of the OPD where we consider irrational behaviours in the population inspired by prospect theory. Prospect theory has gained increasing popularity in recent times thanks to its ability to capture aspects such as reference dependence or loss aversion which are common in human behaviour. This element is original in our formulation of the game and is incorporated in our framework through pairwise comparison dynamics. Recently, the impact of the environment has been studied in the form of feedback on the population dynamics. Another element of novelty in our work is the extension of the game-environment feedback to the OPD in two forms of dynamics, the replicator and the pairwise comparison. The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we propose a modelling framework where prospect theory is used to capture irrational behaviours in an evolutionary game with game-environment feedback. Second, we carry out the stability analysis of the system equilibria and discuss the oscillating behaviours arising from the game-environment feedback. Finally, we extend our previous results to the OPD and we discuss the main differences between the model resulting from the replicator dynamics and the one resulting from the pairwise comparison dynamics.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.07100
Recommendations
- Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma
- A class of evolutionary models for participation games with negative feedback
- Natural selection between two games with environmental feedback
- Preference and evolution in the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Eco-evolutionary dynamics with payoff-dependent environmental feedback
game theoryevolutionary gamesnonlinear dynamicsprospect theorygame-environment feedbackpairwise comparison dynamics
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- The logic of animal conflict
- Deterministic evolutionary game dynamics
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Vaccination and the theory of games
- The evolution of cooperation
- Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy
- Hopf bifurcations and limit cycles in evolutionary network dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions
- Mean-Field Game for Collective Decision-Making in Honeybees via Switched Systems
- A robust saturated strategy for \(n\)-player prisoner's dilemma
- Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback
- Bio-inspired evolutionary dynamics on complex networks under uncertain cross-inhibitory signals
- Multiagent Decision-Making Dynamics Inspired by Honeybees
- Steering eco-evolutionary game dynamics with manifold control
- Subsidy-Based Control of Heterogeneous Multiagent Systems Modeled by Replicator Dynamics
This page was built for publication: The impact of irrational behaviors in the optional prisoner's dilemma with game‐environment feedback
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6152826)
