A robust saturated strategy for n-player prisoner's dilemma
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- A Robust Decentralized Control for Channel Sharing Communication
- A general class of adaptive strategies
- A wide range no-regret theorem
- Adaptive Heuristics
- Allocation processes in cooperative games
- An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
- Approachability in infinite dimensional spaces
- Asymptotic pseudotrajectories and chain recurrent flows, with applications
- Attainability in repeated games with vector payoffs
- Axiomatic approach in differential games
- Continuous Time Repeated Games
- Continuous-time stochastic games
- Evolution of extortion in iterated prisoner's dilemma games
- Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
- Excludability and Bounded Computational Capacity
- GLAD: a simple adaptive strategy that yields cooperation in dilemma games
- Game Theory in Wireless and Communication Networks
- Objective function design for robust optimality of linear control under state-constraints and uncertainty
- On the Existence of Solutions to a Differential Game
- Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Prediction, Learning, and Games
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Regret in the on-line decision problem
- Regret-based continuous-time dynamics.
- Repeated games and qualitative differential games: approachability and comparison of strategies
- Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns
- Set invariance in control
- Set-theoretic methods in control
- Set-valued analysis
- Smale strategies for network prisoner's dilemma games
- Stochastic Approximations and Differential Inclusions
- The Prisoner's Dilemma and Dynamical Systems Associated to Non-Cooperative Games
- The existence of value in differential games of pursuit and evasion
- Viability theory
- Weak Approachability
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