Regret-based continuous-time dynamics.
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Publication:1416502
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00178-7zbMath1134.91313WikidataQ56936130 ScholiaQ56936130MaRDI QIDQ1416502
Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell
Publication date: 14 December 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
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