Improving Nash by coarse correlation

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.008zbMath1292.91008MaRDI QIDQ2439924

Indrajit Ray, Sonali Sen Gupta, Hervé Moulin

Publication date: 26 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.008

zbMATH Keywords

public good; coarse correlated equilibrium; duopoly models; quadratic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91B18: Public goods

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

Related Items

Communication and cooperation in repeated games, Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game, Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience, Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium, Equilibrium computation in resource allocation games, Exact enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for generalized chicken and prisoner's dilemma games

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