Improving Nash by coarse correlation
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Publication:2439924
Recommendations
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- Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs
- Corrigendum to: ``Methods for solving generalized Nash equilibrium
- Nash refinements of equilibria
- Approximations of Nash equilibria
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3128728 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
- A generalization of correlated equilibrium: a new protocol
- Adaptive Heuristics
- Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Correlated equilibrium and concave games
- Correlated equilibrium and potential games
- Correlated equilibrium of Cournot oligopoly competition
- Correlated strategies as institutions
- Correlation and duopoly
- Game theoretic models for climate change negotiations
- Intrinsic robustness of the price of anarchy
- On the existence of a unique correlated equilibrium in Cournot oligopoly
- Regret-based continuous-time dynamics.
- Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- The economic consequences of the peace: Keynes and correlation
Cited in
(8)- Coarse correlated equilibria in linear quadratic mean field games and application to an emission abatement game
- Exact enforcement value of soft correlated equilibrium for generalized chicken and prisoner's dilemma games
- Equilibrium computation in resource allocation games
- Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
- Communication and Cooperation in repeated games
- ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
- Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game
- Correlated equilibrium under costly disobedience
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