Improving Nash by coarse correlation
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Publication:2439924
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.008zbMath1292.91008OpenAlexW2233304286MaRDI QIDQ2439924
Indrajit Ray, Sonali Sen Gupta, Hervé Moulin
Publication date: 26 March 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.10.008
2-person games (91A05) Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
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