Nash refinements of equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF02190062MaRDI QIDQ1338559zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hans Peters, K. Vrieze

Publication date 1 April 1996

Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02190062

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectionmultiplicity of Nash equilibriaNash bargainingrefinement equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

The multiplicity of Nash equilibria in strategic form games restricts the predictive power of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the literature many attempts are made to reduce the set of (Nash) equilibria by keeping the more desirable equilibria (refinements) or to make a convincing unique choice out of the set of Nash equilibria (equilibrium selection). In this paper, the authors start from any refinement and make a choice out of the lotteries over the refinement equilibria, all with the same payoff vector. The method they use to find such lotteries is borrowed from Nash bargaining theory. The set of lotteries is a convex compact set. A map assigning to each strategic game a disagreement point, is introduced (a typical example is the vector of max-min-values for each for the players) and the Nash (bargaining) solution is applied. From the axioms for the Nash bargaining solution an axiomatization of the Nash refinements is deduced.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(17)

• Refinements of Nash equilibrium: A critique
• The Nash solution and independence of revealed irrelevant alternatives
• Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium
• An early paper on the refinement of Nash equilibrium
• Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games
• Extending the Nash solution to choice problems with reference points
• Improving Nash by coarse correlation
• On the Nash equilibrium in the inspector problem
• Axiomatic equilibrium selection for generic two-player games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4213773 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1944155 (Why is no real title available?)
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• REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN VIEW OF JEALOUS OR FRIENDLY BEHAVIOR OF PLAYERS
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7136658 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Nash equilibrium filter
• Theoretical Computer Science
• LATIN 2004: Theoretical Informatics

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