Axiomatic equilibrium selection for generic two-player games

DOI10.3982/ECTA9579MaRDI QIDQ2859511zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Srihari Govindan, Robert Wilson

Publication date 8 November 2013

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9579

zbMATH Keywords

admissibilityaxiombackward inductionembeddinginvariancerefinementsmall worldsstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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Cited in

(10)

• Introspection and equilibrium selection in \(2\times 2\) matrix games
• The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
• A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
• On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria
• Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart -- a study of minimal diversity games
• Forward induction equilibrium
• A best-response approach for equilibrium selection in two-player generalized Nash equilibrium problems
• The evolutionary stability of moral foundations
• Sequentially stable outcomes
• Invariance to representation of information

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