The evolutionary stability of moral foundations

DOI10.1093/QJE/QJAF019MaRDI QIDQ6889101zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Michelle Avataneo, Thomas M. Norman, Nicola Persico

Publication date 5 December 2025

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/QJE/QJAF019

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
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• Evolution of Preferences1
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• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences
• On the evolution of individualistic preferences: An incomplete information scenario
• Strategic behavior of moralists and altruists
• The dynamic evolution of preferences
• The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations
• The logic of animal conflict
• The preferences of homo moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity
• What to maximize if you must

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