Sequentially stable outcomes

DOI10.3982/ECTA21402MaRDI QIDQ6979547zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Francesc Dilmé

Publication date 25 May 2025

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21402

zbMATH Keywords

sequential stabilitysignaling gamesstable outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

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• The impact of reelection pressures on the fulfillment of campaign promises

Cited in

(2)

• Outcome destabilization
• Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games

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