A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium
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Cited in
(40)- A constructive approach to sequential Nash equilibria
- Support restrictions and sequential equilibria
- Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory
- Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
- Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Player importance and forward induction
- Forward induction, public randomization, and admissibility
- Notes on sequence economies, transaction costs, and uncertainty
- Belief-based refinements in signalling games
- How proper is sequential equilibrium?
- Sequential regularity in smooth production economies
- A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
- A simple optimality-based no-bubble theorem for deterministic sequential economies with strictly monotone preferences
- The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements
- The strong sequential core for two-period economies
- On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria
- Limited focus in dynamic games
- Self-rejecting mechanisms
- Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning
- Repeated signaling games
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Transparent restrictions on beliefs and forward-induction reasoning in games with asymmetric information
- Acyclic Preferences and Existence of Sequential Nash Equilibria: A Formal and Constructive Equivalence
- Information, rational beliefs and equilibrium refinements
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7442176 (Why is no real title available?)
- A framework for studying decentralized Bayesian learning with strategic agents
- Signaling, screening, and core stability
- Sophisticated banking contracts and fragility when withdrawal information is public
- The epistemic spirit of divinity
- Outcome destabilization
- Strategic stability in repeated signaling games
- Iterated exclusion of implausible types in signaling games
- Sequentially stable outcomes
- On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response
- Computation of equilibria in noncooperative games
- Signaling, forward induction, and stability in finitely repeated games
- On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
- Dynamic bargaining with action-dependent valuations
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