Limited focus in dynamic games

DOI10.1007/S00182-018-0642-XMaRDI QIDQ2002069zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Andres Perea, Elias Tsakas

Publication date 11 July 2019

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0642-x

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionbounded rationalityepistemic game theoryforward inductionlimited focus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

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Cited in

(2)

• Limited foresight equilibrium
• Trait-augmented games with limited-skill agents

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