Adaptation and complexity in repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.07.008zbMATH Open1134.91329OpenAlexW2145150393MaRDI QIDQ926890FDOQ926890

Eliot Maenner

Publication date: 21 May 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

learningcomplexityrepeated gamesbounded rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
• Self-Confirming Equilibrium
• Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
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• Simplicity of beliefs and delay tactics in a concession game
• Limited foresight may force cooperation
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Bargaining and markets: Complexity and the competitive outcome
• Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
• Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
• Limited horizon forecast in repeated alternate games
• Nash equilibrium when players account for the complexity of their forecasts.
• In defense of DEFECT.
• Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games

Cited In (4)

• Limited focus in dynamic games
• Rational belief hierarchies
• Game Theory and Strategic Complexity
• Adapting paths against zero-determinant strategies in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

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