Adaptation and complexity in repeated games
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Publication:926890
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008zbMath1134.91329OpenAlexW2145150393MaRDI QIDQ926890
Publication date: 21 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.008
Related Items (3)
Cites Work
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