Rational belief hierarchies
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Publication:2444694
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.10.005zbMath1296.91050OpenAlexW2108298734MaRDI QIDQ2444694
Publication date: 10 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/408e54e8-59e8-4124-bc03-f140d54d1fdf
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