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Cites work
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1166155 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3274494 (Why is no real title available?)
- Interactive epistemology. II: Probability
- Probability logic for type spaces
- Probability logic of finitely additive beliefs
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Reasoning about knowledge and probability
- The Bayesian formulation of incomplete information. The non-compact case
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- The non-existence of a universal topological type space
- Topology-free typology of beliefs
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