Topology-free typology of beliefs
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Publication:1276113
DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2435zbMath0921.90156MaRDI QIDQ1276113
Publication date: 17 September 1999
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/6980fe1bc4d29e0bad67f084f9217116c23e41fa
91A44: Games involving topology, set theory, or logic
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Cites Work
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