Communication in games of incomplete information: Two players

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.003zbMath1142.91308OpenAlexW2089617249MaRDI QIDQ869888

R. Vijay Krishna

Publication date: 9 March 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.003

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian gamesunmediated communicationcheap-communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Communication with tokens in repeated games on networks ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information ⋮ Perfect implementation ⋮ Rational belief hierarchies ⋮ Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games ⋮ Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types ⋮ A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
• One-shot public mediated talk
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Universal Mechanisms
• Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example
• Multistage Games with Communication
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Long Cheap Talk