Learning to play limited forecast equilibria

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0589zbMath0895.90190MaRDI QIDQ1384018

Philippe Jehiel

Publication date: 13 April 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4feb2cbc8b1fdf898ec4a62abc9a5458017950af

zbMATH Keywords

learning; limited forecast equilibria; stochastically stable outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91E40: Memory and learning in psychology

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

Adaptation and complexity in repeated games, Learning by trial and error, Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium., Analogy-based expectation equilibrium, Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique

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