Bayesian learning in normal form games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90005-YzbMath0751.90087OpenAlexW2129760941MaRDI QIDQ1192635

James S. Jordan

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90005-y

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriafinite-player finite-strategy normal form gamesmyopic Bayesian learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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