The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games
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(12)- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
- Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games
- Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems
- Learning from others: A welfare analysis
- Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games?
- Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
- Convergence conditions for the Brown-Robinson iterative method for bimatrix games
- Bayesian learning in repeated normal form games
- Learning communicative actions of conflicting human agents
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1189219 (Why is no real title available?)
- Bayesian learning, smooth approximate optimal behavior, and convergence to \({\varepsilon}\)-Nash equilibrium
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