The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90015-KzbMATH Open0772.90087MaRDI QIDQ1189698FDOQ1189698

Authors: James S. Jordan 

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumexponential convergenceprior beliefsBayesian learning processesgeneral finite- player, finite-strategy normal form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Cites Work

• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• An iterative method of solving a game
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games

Cited In (12)

• Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games?
• Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
• Bayesian learning, smooth approximate optimal behavior, and convergence to \({\varepsilon}\)-Nash equilibrium
• Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Learning from others: A welfare analysis
• Convergence conditions for the Brown-Robinson iterative method for bimatrix games
• Bayesian learning in repeated normal form games
• Learning communicative actions of conflicting human agents
• Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games

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