The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90015-KMaRDI QIDQ1189698zbMATHFDO

Authors James S. Jordan

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumexponential convergenceprior beliefsBayesian learning processesgeneral finite- player, finite-strategy normal form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

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• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
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• Bayesian learning in normal form games

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(12)

• Learning communicative actions of conflicting human agents
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1189219 (Why is no real title available?)
• Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games?
• Bayesian learning, smooth approximate optimal behavior, and convergence to \({\varepsilon}\)-Nash equilibrium
• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Bayesian learning in repeated normal form games
• Convergence conditions for the Brown-Robinson iterative method for bimatrix games
• Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
• Learning from others: A welfare analysis
• Bayesian learning leads to correlated equilibria in normal form games
• Hope springs eternal: Learning and the stability of cooperation in short horizon repeated games.
• Convergence and approximation results for non-cooperative Bayesian games: Learning theorems

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