Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
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Publication:1288242
DOI10.1006/game.1998.0660zbMath0918.90150MaRDI QIDQ1288242
Publication date: 4 August 1999
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0660
pure strategy Nash equilibrium; rational players; weakly dominated strategies; adaptive learning process
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Cites Work
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