Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90006-ZzbMath0751.90093OpenAlexW2142850237WikidataQ56481621 ScholiaQ56481621MaRDI QIDQ1192636

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90006-z

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium adaptive learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Related Items

No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand, Knowledge and best responses in games, An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow., Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term, Fictitious play in an evolutionary environment, Dynamics Associated to Games (Fictitious Play) with Chaotic Behavior, Finite automata play repeated prisoner's dilemma with information processing costs, On the origin of convention: Evidence from symmetric bargaining games, Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium, Belief affirming in learning processes, Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information, Convergence of incentive-driven dynamics in Fisher markets, Learning from personal experience: One rational gay and the justification of myopia, Can we rationally learn to coordinate?, Convergence of deep fictitious play for stochastic differential games, Best replies and adaptive learning, Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium, Long-run dynamics of queues: Stability and chaos, Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game, Process technologies, learning and brand proliferation, Learning and selfconfirming equilibria in network games, Characterizing stability properties in games with strategic substitutes, Order independence for rationalizability, Equilibrium in secure strategies as a development of the concept of Nash equilibrium, On the existence of stable equilibria in monotone games, Independent learning in stochastic games, Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment, Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium., Information and learning in oligopoly: an experiment, Fictitious play in networks, Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations, Unnamed Item, Secure implementation in production economies, A dynamic Cournot-Nash game: a representation of a finitely repeated feedback game, Two more classes of games with the continuous-time fictitious play property, Fictitious play in 3\(\times \)3 games: The transition between periodic and chaotic behaviour, Epistemic conditions for rationalizability, Learning by matching patterns., Multi-level evolution in population games, Aggregation in a model of price competition, Deterministic calibration and Nash equilibrium, Learning in Games, A station strategy to deter backoff attacks in IEEE 802.11 LANs, The exponential convergence of Bayesian learning in normal form games, Learning and transfer in signaling games, Optimal pricing against a simple learning rule, Supply function equilibria for uniform price auction in oligopolistic markets, Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory, On the evolution of optimizing behavior, On the limit points of discrete selection dynamics, Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited, Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms, Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games, Learning in network contexts: experimental results from simulations, Multiagent cooperative search for portfolio selection, Learning in games by random sampling, Dynamic learning in a two-person experimental game, Fictitious play in \(2\times n\) games, Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms, Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies, Fictitious play in \(3 \times 3\) games: chaos and dithering behaviour, A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information, Brown's original fictitious play, Choosing a good toolkit. I: Prior-free heuristics, Theories of coalitional rationality, On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games, A GENERALIZED MODEL OF BEST RESPONSE ADAPTATION, Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale, A learning approach to auctions, On the nonconvergence of fictitious play in coordination games, Learning, matching, and aggregation, Fictitious play in \(2\times 3\) games, On dynamic adjustment and comparative statics via the implicit function theorem, Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance, Comparative statics of a signaling game: An experimental study, Economists' models of learning, SOLVING LARGE GAMES WITH SIMULATED FICTITIOUS PLAY, A surprise-quiz view of learning in economic experiments, Cooperation vs. competition in R\&D: The role of stability of equilibrium, Asynchronous choice and Markov equilibria, Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?, Strategic properties of heterogeneous serial cost sharing, Simple and complex adjustment dynamics in Cournot duopoly models., Entropic penalties in finite games

Cites Work