Best replies and adaptive learning

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(95)00792-XMaRDI QIDQ1377489zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors J. S. Gans

Publication date 11 May 1998

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00792-x

zbMATH Keywords

best replyiterated elimination of strictly dominated strategieslearning processesmonotone game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Recommendations

• Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
• Learning in games by random sampling
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Learning in games with strategic complementarities revisited

Cites work

• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Comparative statics under uncertainty for a class of economic agents
• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• Equilibrium Points in Nonzero-Sum n-Person Submodular Games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3348831 (Why is no real title available?)
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities

Cited in

(2)

• Adaptive learning and iterated weak dominance
• Best-reply matching in games.

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