Learning in games by random sampling
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5938633
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2694zbMath0994.91006MaRDI QIDQ5938633
James W. Friedman, Claudio Mezzetti
Publication date: 23 July 2001
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/98d50a50ffe4dcb8f7924b0fd3817aff2af7658c
91A10: Noncooperative games
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
91A20: Multistage and repeated games
Related Items
Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria, Regret matching with finite memory, On the structure of weakly acyclic games, Forward-looking behavior in hawk-dove games in endogenous networks: experimental evidence, Cournot tâtonnement and dominance solvability in finite games, Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms, Nash equilibrium in compact-continuous games with a potential, Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation, Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games, Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium, Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games, BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
- Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
- Bayesian learning in normal form games
- Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
- Evolution and market behavior
- On the evolution of optimizing behavior
- Learning mixed equilibria
- Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
- A characterization of ordinal potential games
- Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
- Potential games
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
- Learning purified mixed equilibria
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
