A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information
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Publication:2506314
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.009zbMath1125.91017OpenAlexW2013340500WikidataQ58482937 ScholiaQ58482937MaRDI QIDQ2506314
Juin-Kuan Chong, Colin F. Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho
Publication date: 28 September 2006
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.009
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- Stochastic game theory: For playing games, not just for doing theory
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
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