On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
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Publication:1804638
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80003-XzbMath0833.90147MaRDI QIDQ1804638
Tilman Börgers, Maarten C. W. Janssen
Publication date: 15 May 1995
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80003-x
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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