On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80003-XzbMath0833.90147MaRDI QIDQ1804638

Tilman Börgers, Maarten C. W. Janssen

Publication date: 15 May 1995

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(05)80003-x

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot equilibrium; oligopolistic competition; dominance solvability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games, When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?, Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games, Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games

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