Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model

DOI10.2307/2297931zbMATH Open0751.90013OpenAlexW2044956951MaRDI QIDQ3989003FDOQ3989003

Authors: Tilman Börgers 

Publication date: 28 June 1992

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297931

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zbMATH Keywords

Bertrand-Edgeworth model of price competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited In (13)

• Iterated elimination procedures
• The Complexity of Eliminating Dominated Strategies
• Myopic oligopoly pricing
• When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?
• Maximum games, dominance solvability, and coordination
• Elimination of dominated strategies and inessential players
• On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
• Price competition for an informed buyer
• On the order of eliminating dominated strategies
• Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in finite exchange economies.
• The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network
• Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium large markets with non-manipulable residual demand
• Static search games played over graphs and general metric spaces

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