Rationing rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large markets
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Publication:899809
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90047-9zbMATH Open1328.91196OpenAlexW2070193678MaRDI QIDQ899809FDOQ899809
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90047-9
General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Cites Work
- Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints
- Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets
- Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
- Cournot Oligopoly and Competitive Behaviour
- A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
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Cited In (20)
- Oligopoly pricing: the role of firm size and number
- Rationing, bargaining, and voting in 2-sided markets
- Tail expectation and imperfect competition in limit order book markets
- Attainment of equilibrium via Marshallian path adjustment: queueing and buyer determinism
- Myopic oligopoly pricing
- A Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopoly with a public firm
- Verifying payoff security in the mixed extension of discontinuous games
- On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
- Ex-post price stability with convex costs
- Bertrand--Edgeworth equilibria with unobservable output, uncoordinated consumers and large number of firms
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Competition in online markets with auctions and posted prices
- Bertrand competition with incomplete share for lower price
- Information, Bertrand-Edgeworth competition and the law of one price
- Existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in Bertrand-Edgeworth oligopolies
- Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints
- A DYNAMIC ENTRY AND PRICE GAME WITH CAPACITY INDIVISIBILITY
- Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium large markets with non-manipulable residual demand
- Production in advance versus production to order: equilibrium and social surplus
- Prices in a shopbot market
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