Rationing rules and Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria in large markets

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90047-9zbMath1328.91196MaRDI QIDQ899809

Xavier Vives

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90047-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B50: General equilibrium theory

91B54: Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand)

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Cites Work

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• Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly
• Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets
• A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium
• Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints
• Cournot Oligopoly and Competitive Behaviour