Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.003zbMath1236.91037MaRDI QIDQ536102

Muhamet Yildiz, Jonathan Weinstein

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

sensitivity; robustness; incomplete information; universal type space; higher-order beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A44: Games involving topology, set theory, or logic

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

91B44: Economics of information

Related Items

A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games, An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences, Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity, Invariance to representation of information

Cites Work

• The context of the game
• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• Invariance to representation of information
• A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
• Impact of higher-order uncertainty
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model