Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
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Publication:536102
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.07.003zbMATH Open1236.91037OpenAlexW2080077874MaRDI QIDQ536102FDOQ536102
Authors: Jonathan Weinstein, Muhamet Yildiz 
Publication date: 16 May 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.003
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(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
- Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- The context of the game
- Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
- Invariance to representation of information
- A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games
- On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
- Impact of higher-order uncertainty
- On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty
Cited In (8)
- Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
- A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
- Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
- Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
- An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
- Impact of higher-order uncertainty
- Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
- Invariance to representation of information
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