Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.07.003MaRDI QIDQ536102zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan Weinstein, Muhamet Yildiz

Publication date 16 May 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

sensitivityrobustnessincomplete informationhigher-order beliefsuniversal type space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
• Impact of higher-order uncertainty
• Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
• Finite-order type spaces and applications
• Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity

Cites work

• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• A characterization of the class of rationalizable equilibria of oligopoly games
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Dominance solvability and Cournot stability
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Impact of higher-order uncertainty
• Invariance to representation of information
• On the dominance solvability of large Cournot games
• On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• The context of the game

Cited in

(8)

• Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
• Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
• Correlated equilibrium and higher order beliefs about play
• Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
• Invariance to representation of information
• A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
• An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
• Impact of higher-order uncertainty

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