Impact of higher-order uncertainty

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.10.002MaRDI QIDQ2384440zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jonathan Weinstein, Muhamet Yildiz

Publication date 21 September 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/63742

zbMATH Keywords

Higher-order uncertaintyincomplete informationstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving topology, set theory, or logic (91A44)

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Cites work

• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• The relevance of private information in mechanism design
• Uncertainty about Uncertainty and Delay in Bargaining

Cited in

(14)

• Strategic wholesale pricing in a supply chain with a potential entrant
• Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty
• Finite-order type spaces and applications
• Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
• Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
• Extensive games with possibly unaware players
• An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals
• On the relationship between hierarchy and type morphisms
• Universal type structures with unawareness
• Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games
• Strategic mistakes
• Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games
• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
• When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?

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