Depth of knowledge and the effect of higher order uncertainty
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Cites work
- Agreeing to disagree
- An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge
- Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
- Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
- Finite bubbles with short sale constraints and asymmetric information
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- Logical structure of common knowledge
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
- Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
- p-Dominance and Belief Potential
Cited in
(9)- The simplest rational greater-fool bubble model
- Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
- Depth of Reasoning and Information Revelation: An Experiment on the Distribution of k-Levels
- Impact of higher-order uncertainty
- Do you know that I know that you know\dots? Higher-order beliefs in survey data
- Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study
- Logics in Artificial Intelligence
- Hesitation Degrees as the Size of Ignorance Combined with Fuzziness
- (A)symmetric information bubbles: experimental evidence
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