Higher Order Uncertainty and Information: Static and Dynamic Games
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Publication:2859066
DOI10.3982/ECTA9159zbMath1274.91017OpenAlexW2141756751MaRDI QIDQ2859066
Publication date: 6 November 2013
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9159
robustnessuniquenessinformationhigher-order beliefshierarchies of beliefsinterim sequential rationalizability
Related Items (9)
Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ Uncertain information structures and backward induction ⋮ A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs ⋮ Robust dynamic implementation ⋮ A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
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