A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs
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Publication:403966
DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0394-6zbMath1296.91049OpenAlexW1990567021MaRDI QIDQ403966
Publication date: 29 August 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp602.pdf
Related Items (2)
Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players ⋮ Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
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