Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
From MaRDI portal
Publication:548258
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.018zbMath1246.91035MaRDI QIDQ548258
Giuseppe Lopomo, Luca Rigotti, Chris Shannon
Publication date: 28 June 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.018
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