Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.018MaRDI QIDQ548258zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Giuseppe Lopomo, Luca Rigotti, Chris Shannon

Publication date 28 June 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.018

zbMATH Keywords

Knightian uncertaintyincomplete preferencesmoral hazardcontract theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Utility theory (91B16)

Recommendations

• Optimal contract for the principal-agent under Knightian uncertainty
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• Subjective Beliefs and ex ante Trade
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
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Cited in

(33)

• A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
• Robust monopoly pricing
• Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
• Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics
• Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
• Robust incentives for risk
• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• A simple impossibility result in behavioral contract theory
• Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
• Ambiguous persuasion
• Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes
• Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
• Full surplus extraction from samples
• Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
• Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
• Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences
• Robust contracting under double moral hazard
• Contract theory in a VUCA world
• Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
• Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
• Remarks on the consumer problem under incomplete preferences
• Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
• On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences
• Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models
• Knightian uncertainty and insurance regulation decision
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Robust screening under ambiguity

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