Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
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Publication:548258
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.018zbMATH Open1246.91035OpenAlexW2103840301MaRDI QIDQ548258FDOQ548258
Authors: Giuseppe Lopomo, Luca Rigotti, Chris Shannon 
Publication date: 28 June 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.018
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Cited In (33)
- A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs
- Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
- Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- Robust monopoly pricing
- Robust incentives for risk
- Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
- Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics
- The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
- A simple impossibility result in behavioral contract theory
- Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
- Ambiguous persuasion
- Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes
- Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
- Full surplus extraction from samples
- Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
- Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
- Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences
- Robust contracting under double moral hazard
- Contract theory in a VUCA world
- Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
- Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
- Remarks on the consumer problem under incomplete preferences
- Locally robust contracts for moral hazard
- On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences
- Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Robust contract designs: linear contracts and moral hazard
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models
- Knightian uncertainty and insurance regulation decision
- On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
- Robust screening under ambiguity
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