Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.03.018zbMATH Open1246.91035OpenAlexW2103840301MaRDI QIDQ548258FDOQ548258

Giuseppe Lopomo, Chris Shannon, Luca Rigotti

Publication date: 28 June 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.018

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zbMATH Keywords

Knightian uncertaintyincomplete preferencesmoral hazardcontract theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Inequalities; stochastic orderings (60E15) Utility theory (91B16)

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Cited In (29)

• A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs
• Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
• Knightian games and robustness to ambiguity
• Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
• Robust monopoly pricing
• Robust incentives for risk
• Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
• Introduction to incompleteness and uncertainty in economics
• The principal-agent problem with smooth ambiguity
• Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design
• Ambiguous persuasion
• Robust trading mechanisms over 0/1 polytopes
• Imperfect public monitoring with a fear of signal distortion
• Full surplus extraction from samples
• Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
• Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts
• Optimality in an OLG model with nonsmooth preferences
• Robust contracting under double moral hazard
• Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs
• Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
• Remarks on the consumer problem under incomplete preferences
• On the indifference relation in Bewley preferences
• Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
• Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Ambiguity, optimism, and pessimism in adverse selection models
• Knightian uncertainty and insurance regulation decision
• On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences
• Robust screening under ambiguity

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