Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
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Cites work
- A More Robust Definition of Subjective Probability
- Dynamic choice under ambiguity
- Dynamic variational preferences
- Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
- Learning Under Ambiguity
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Optimal contracts for experimentation
- Recursive multiple-priors.
- Recursive smooth ambiguity preferences
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits
Cited in
(9)- Adaptive Contracting: The Trial-and-Error Approach to Outsourcing
- Contracting for technology improvement: the effect of asymmetric bargaining power and investment uncertainty
- Anticipating Disagreement in Dynamic Contracting
- Adaptive contracting: the trial-and-error approach to outsourcing
- R\&D outsourcing in an innovation-driven supply chain
- Outsourcing of innovation
- Effects of informal contracts on innovative cooperation among enterprises in industrial clusters: an evolutionary game analysis
- The Management of Innovation
- A comparison of milestone contract and royalty contract under critical value criterion in R\&D alliance
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