Optimal contracts for experimentation
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Recommendations
- Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
- Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
- The simple analytics of information and experimentation in dynamic agency
- Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
- Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
Cited in
(38)- Hierarchical experimentation
- Adaptive contracting: the trial-and-error approach to outsourcing
- Dynamic contractual incentives in the face of a Samaritans's dilemma
- Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs
- Dead ends
- Strategic observation with exponential bandits
- Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium
- Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity
- Optimal contract for outsourcing information acquisition
- Learning from failures: optimal contracts for experimentation and production
- Dynamic contracts and learning by doing
- Robust incentives for information acquisition
- Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning
- Monitoring innovation
- Optimal Contracts for Teams
- Dynamic costs and moral hazard: a duality-based approach
- Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts
- Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
- Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge
- Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives
- Production priorities in dynamic relationships
- Delegated concept testing in new product development
- Adaptive Contracting: The Trial-and-Error Approach to Outsourcing
- Information and experimentation in short-term contracting
- Experimentation in organizations
- Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option
- A model of privately funded public research
- Innovation through competitive experimentation
- ENTREPRENEUR–INVESTOR INFORMATION DESIGN
- Screening for experiments
- Experimentation and approval mechanisms
- Do stronger patents lead to faster innovation? The effect of clustered search
- Diversification and information in contests
- Feedback design in dynamic moral hazard
- The simple analytics of information and experimentation in dynamic agency
- Optimal allocation strategies in a discrete-time bandit problem
- Rewarding success and failure: moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic experimentation
- The optimal design of rewards in contests
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