The optimal design of rewards in contests

DOI10.1007/S10058-015-0179-4zbMATH Open1329.91052OpenAlexW3123855500WikidataQ57921789 ScholiaQ57921789MaRDI QIDQ905170FDOQ905170

Authors: Todd R. Kaplan, David Wettstein 

Publication date: 14 January 2016

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0179-4

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zbMATH Keywords

innovationall-pay auctionscontestsmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• The all-pay auction with complete information
• All-Pay Contests
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• Optimal contracts for experimentation
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants

Cited In (32)

• Reward design in risk-taking contests
• Parallel innovation contests
• Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes
• Multiplicative output form and its applications to problems in the homogenous innovation contest model
• Prizes versus contracts as incentives for innovation
• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes
• Tullock contests reward information advantages
• Optimal Award Scheme in Innovation Tournaments
• Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
• On the optimal design of biased contests
• Optimal contest design: tuning the heat
• Costly information providing in binary contests
• Amortizing securities as a Pareto-efficient reward mechanism
• Innovation contests with entry auction
• The design of reward structures in career games: a relative deprivation approach
• Innovation contests with risk‐averse participants
• ENHANCING EFFORT SUPPLY WITH PRIZE‐AUGMENTING ENTRY FEES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
• Contingent payments in selection contests
• The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
• Two-stage contests with effort-dependent values of winning
• Degree of difficulty as the objective of contest design
• Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest
• Performance enhancement in two-stage innovation contests: feedback and elimination schemes
• Crowdsourcing contests
• Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Designing dynamic contests
• Innovation through competitive experimentation
• Award scheme in random trial contests
• Innovation contests with temporary and endogenous monopoly rents

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