The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.10.026zbMATH Open1311.91118OpenAlexW2060162818MaRDI QIDQ2345264FDOQ2345264

Authors: Xuyuan Liu, Jingfeng Lu 

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.026

Recommendations

• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Winner's effort maximization in large contests
• Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments
• Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in tullock contests
• The optimal allocation of prizes in two-stage contests
• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• Multi-player, multi-prize, imperfectly discriminating contests
• The optimal design of rewards in contests
• Contests with a constrained choice set of effort
• Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctiongrand contestsplit contestsubcontestvirtual effort of efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Contest architecture
• Optimal Auction Design
• A mechanism design approach to ranking asymmetric auctions
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests

Cited In (24)

• Optimal prize allocations in group contests
• Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules
• Allocation rules of indivisible prizes in team contests
• Winner's effort maximization in large contests
• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• The beauty of ``bigness: On optimal design of multi-winner contests
• Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes
• (In)efficient public-goods provision through contests
• Optimal tie-breaking rules
• Performance-maximizing large contests
• Incentives versus competitive balance
• Costly information providing in binary contests
• On optimal favoritism in all-pay contests
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Tournaments with prize-setting agents
• ENHANCING EFFORT SUPPLY WITH PRIZE‐AUGMENTING ENTRY FEES: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
• The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
• Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
• Correction to: ``Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests
• Optimal effort incentives in dynamic tournaments
• Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs
• Competitive balance when winning breeds winners
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Multiple prizes in research tournaments

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