(In)efficient public-goods provision through contests

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0769-4MaRDI QIDQ483551zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Kolmar, Dana Sisak

Publication date 17 December 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0769-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Public goods (91B18) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Recommendations

• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities
• Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
• Performance-maximizing large contests
• Reduced prizes and increased effort in contests
• The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes

Cites work

• Contest success functions
• Financing public goods by means of lotteries.
• Funding public goods with lotteries: experimental evidence.
• Incentives in Teams
• Micro foundations of multi-prize lottery contests: a perspective of noisy performance ranking
• On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: the two player case
• Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents

Cited in

(3)

• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities
• Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision
• A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents

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