On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: the two player case

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.10.024MaRDI QIDQ2345266zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Wolfgang Leininger, Jörg Franke

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.024

zbMATH Keywords

biased lotteriescharitiespublic good provision

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Financing public goods by means of lotteries.
• Providing public goods in two steps
• Funding public goods with lotteries: experimental evidence.
• Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
• Public-Good Provision with Many Participants

Cites work

• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Financing public goods by means of lotteries.
• On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: the two player case
• Providing public goods in two steps

Cited in

(10)

• The strategic advantage of being less skilled
• On the disclosure of ticket sales in charitable lotteries
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power
• Providing public goods in two steps
• Earmarking lottery proceeds for public goods: empirical evidence from U.S. Lotto expenditures
• On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: the two player case
• Financing public goods by means of lotteries.
• Funding public goods with lotteries: experimental evidence.
• (In)efficient public-goods provision through contests
• Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition

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